We apply the private core and the private value to a dynamic economy and study the evolution of private core and private value allocations as individuals acquire information Ž . learn through time. In particular, a realized agreement in each period generates information that changes the underlying information structure in the economy. Since the private Ž . core value depends on the distribution of information across individuals, when agents learn some new information a realized agreement may no longer be in the private core Ž . value for the new information structure that arises. We define a 'limit full information' Ž .
Abstract
We apply the private core and the private value to a dynamic economy and study the evolution of private core and private value allocations as individuals acquire information Ž . learn through time. In particular, a realized agreement in each period generates information that changes the underlying information structure in the economy. Since the private Ž . core value depends on the distribution of information across individuals, when agents learn some new information a realized agreement may no longer be in the private core Ž . value for the new information structure that arises. We define a 'limit full information' Ž .
t economy and address the following issues; i Given a sequence x of approximate private Ž . core value allocations in each period, there is a subsequence that converges to a private Ž . ) Ž . Ž . core value x allocation for the limit full information economy. ii Private core value allocations x ) in the limit full information economy, can be approximated by a sequence t Ž . x of approximate private core value allocations in each time period. The approximate e notions we consider can be viewed as the errors that agents make due to bounded rationality. q 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
There is an interesting growing literature on learning which mainly focuses on non-cooperative equilibrium concepts in either normal or extensive form games, Ž . Ž . Ž . e.g., Feldman 1987 , Kalai and Lehrer 1993 , Nyarko 1994 among others. We depart from the above literature by examining learning in differential information economies with solution concepts which may be cooperative. In particular, we abandon the rational expectations equilibrium notion and examine concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We wish to emphasize at the outset that the Ž . study of cooperative solution concepts e.g., the core and the value in differential information economies appears to be a successful alternative to the traditional rational expectations equilibrium, because they provide sensible and reasonable Ž . outcomes in situations where any rational expectations equilibrium REE notion fails to do so. 1 We begin by defining the concept of an economy with differential information w x or Radner-type economy, Radner, 1968 . Let Y s R l l be the positive cone of l l-fold Cartesian product of the set of real q Ž .
2 numbers R and let V,F F,m be a probability measure space. An exchange ÄŽ . economy with differential information E E is given by E Es X ,u ,F F ,e ,q : Kurz 1994 has also introduced an alternative to the rational expectations equilibrium. Although his viewpoint is different than ours, it also appears to provide more sensible results than the traditional rational expectations equilibrium.
2 The results of this paper hold true even if Y is the positive cone of a Banach lattice with an order Ž . continuous norm see Section 5 for a precise definition . Hence infinitely, many commodities are allowed in our model.
3
Ž . Throughout our analysis we follow Aumann 1987 and assume that the private information sets Ä 4 n F F are common knowledge.
Ž .
A possible interpretation of the above economy is the following: one may think that there are two periods where actual consumption takes place in the second period. In period one, there is uncertainty over the states of nature and in this period agents make agreements in an interim stage, i.e., once they are informed which is the event which contains the realized state of nature. Agents have different priors and they update them using the Bayes' rule. Once the state of nature is realized agents carry out the agreements made in the interim stage and consumption takes place. The traditional notion which has been adopted in the literature to analyze trade Ž . in a differential information economy is the rational expectation price equilibrium. One of the criticisms of the above notion is that it does not provide a mechanism which describes how equilibrium prices reflect the information asym-Ž . metries of the economy. To this end we adopt the private core Yannelis, 1991 Ž . Ž . and the private Shapley value Krasa and Yannelis, 1994 in order to analyze the trading procedure under differential information. Both notions are not fully cooperative in a differential information economy framework, because within a coalition agents make redistributions of their initial endowments based on their Ž . own private information without necessarily sharing it . Hence, despite the fact Ž that coalitions of agents get together and make redistributions the cooperative . aspect of the model there is a non-cooperative element in that agents in the coalition bargain using their differential information. This non-cooperative feature of the private core and private value results in allocations which are always coalitionally incentive compatible and they take into account the information Ž . 5 superiority of an individual contrary to the REE .
, where Moreover , it has been indicated in Koutsougeras-Yannelis and Krasa-Yanne-Ž . lis, that the resulting private core value allocation will always depend on the underlying information structure. Thus, it is natural to conclude that the set of Ž . private core or private value allocations will be affected by changes in the underlying information structure of the economy. The concept of learning introduces changes in the information structure in a natural way. In particular, we will define a differential information economy that extends to many periods. Agents are endowed with some initial private information, drawn from their personal Ž . characteristics i.e., their random preferences and random initial endowment . However, in each period agents acquire new information by observing the realized Ž . core or value allocation and they use this new information in subsequent periods. To be precise consider the differential information economy E E in a dynamic framework. Ä 4 Ž t . Let the set T s 1,2, . . . denote the time horizon, and denote by s e ,u the i i s-algebra that the random initial endowment and random utility function of agent i, generate at time t in T. This is the initial information of agent i at time t. At any given point in time t g T, the private information set of agent i is defined as:
where x ty1 , x ty2 , . . . are past period private core allocations. In other words, at any given point in time t, the private information which is available to agent i is Ž t . hisrher initial information s e ,u together with the information that private core i i allocations generated in all previous periods, i.e., t y 1, t y 2, . . . In this scenario, the private information set of agent i in period t q 1 will be F F t together with the i Ž t . information that the private core allocation generated at period t, i.e., s x . Thus, the private information set of agent i at time t q 1 will be Ž . Eq. 1.3 represents a learning process for agent i and it generates a sequence of Ä t 4 differential information economies E E : t g T defined as above where now the Ž . private information set of each agent is given by Eq. 1.2
It is important to note that agents are myopic, in the sense that they do not form expectations over the entire horizon but only for the current period, i.e., each agent's interim expected utility is based on the current period private information. Obviously, since the private information set of each agent becomes finer from Ž . period to period because of the acquired new information , the interim expected utility of each agent is changing from period to period as well. In this scenario the Ž . information that the private core or value allocation generates at a given time t Ž . in T, obviously will affect the private core or value outcome in the subsequent 
Both agents have the same utility function given by u v, x, y s xy , for each
Suppose that nature chooses state a which is in the event a,b for agent Ä 4 . K and a,c for agent L . It can be checked that in period t the private core allocation is the initial endowment, 7 i.e., the private core allocation in period t is Ž t t . Ž t t . the vector x , x s e ,e and each agent gets zero utility. Notice that
private core allocation generates in period t is the full information partition. Therefore, the private information set of each agent in period t q 1 will be:
Now in the second period, agents will make contracts based on the private Ž . information sets given by Eq. 1.5 . One can show that the private core allocation in period t q 1 is the following:
Notice that the above allocation makes both agents better off from the allocation Ž . Ž . given by Eq. 1.4 they both now have positive utility . In other words, both agents by observing the private core allocation in period t and refining their private information they result in a Pareto superior allocation. 6 In other words the endowment pattern is as follows:
7 Since the partitions are independent, agents cannot insure each other and no trade is the equilibrium outcome in period t. See also definition 2.1 for a rigorous definition of the private core.
( )
In the above simple example, learning enabled the two agents to reach the limit full information private core in period t q 1 where no further trade improvement is possible. However, in a general model with more than two agents and a continuum of states there is no need to reach the limit full information private core outcome in two periods. Our main objective in this paper is to examine the convergence of Ž . the private core or private value of the infinitely repeated differential information economy. In particular, let us denote the one shot limit full information economy 8 Ž . 4 by E Es X , u , F F , e , q : i s 1,2, . . . ,n where F F is the pooled information of
agent i over the entire horizon, i.e., F F sk F F and e is F F -measurable.
The questions that this paper addresses are the following.
t a sequence of private core or value allocation for E E can we extract a Ž . subsequence which converges to a limit full information private core or value allocation for the limit full information economy E E?
Ž . Ž . ii Is question i still true if we allow for bounded rationality in the sense that t Ž . the sequence x is now an approximate or e-private core or e-value allocation for t Ž . E E , but nonetheless it converges to an exact private core or value allocation?
Ž . Ž . iii Given a limit full information private core or value allocation say x for E E Ž . can we construct a sequence of approximate or e-private core or e-value t t Ž allocations x in E E which converges to the limit full information private core or . value allocation x of E E? In other words, given a limit full information private Ž . core or value allocation can we construct a sequence of bounded rational plays Ž . i.e., e-private core or e-private value allocations which converges to the limit full Ž . information private core value allocation.
We indeed provide positive answers to all the above questions. It should be noted that in this paper not only do we address learning in differential information economies adopting cooperative solution concepts for the first time, but we also make several technical advances. In particular, we will allow for continuous time, i.e., the time horizon set T, may be any arbitrary infinite set, utility functions are Ž . concave hence risk aversion is allowed agents are allowed to be bounded rational during the learning process and the state space and the commodity space need not be finite. The above generalization necessitates the use of functional and measure analytic methods.
Finally, it should be noted that since our framework is quite general, it may be the case that in the limit incomplete information may still prevail. In other words, it could be the case that
Ž . Hence, in the limit a private core or value allocation may not be a fully revealing 8 An alternative terminology may be maximal information economy.
. core or value allocation. However, if the learning through the private core Ž . value allocation of each period reaches the complete information in the limit, i.e.,
Ž . then our first converge result indicates that the private core value allocation is Ž . indeed a fully revealing core value allocation.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we provide definitions of the private and approximate private core. Sections 3 and 4 contain the main results and all the proofs are collected in Section 5.
The private core and the e-private core
Before we state our main results for the private core we will redefine below the private core in a more convenient way.
Ž . For each i, let L denote the set of all Bochner integrable and F F -measurable
now restate definition 1.1 in a more convenient way as follows:
The allocation x g L is said to be a private core allocation for E E
ii it is not true that there exist coalition S and y g Ł L such that
e., and for all i g S. i e S i ie S i i i i i
Note that since the initial endowment of each agent is measurable with respect to Ž . hisrher own partition and each vector x v is F F -measurable, the net trades are
The allocation x g L is said to be an approximate or e-private x Ž . core allocation for E E if in addition to i above it satisfies Ž X . ii it is not true that there exist coalition S and y g Ł L such that
Ž . Ž . Ý y s Ý e and Õ v, y ) Õ v, x q e m-a.e. and for all i g S.
Condition ii in definition 2.1 is almost identical to condition ii in definition 2.2, except that it requires the dominance of a contending allocation to be stronger. . One may think of e which is a small positive number as the cost of coalition Ž formation, although a wide variety of interpretations involving agents' reluctance . Ž . to join a coalition may also apply. Denote by C E E the set of all private core Ž . allocations for E E, and by C E E the set of e-private core allocations for E E. . 4 E E : t g T , where E E s X ,u ,e ,F F ,q : i s 1,2, . . . ,n is defined as in Section
The limit full information economy
Let F F be the pooled information of agent i over the entire time horizon T, i t ÄŽ . i.e., F F s E F F . The differential information economy E Es X ,u ,e ,F F ,q : 1,2, . . . ,n represents an economy where the private information of each agent, i.e., F F is hisrher pooled information over the entire time horizon, and may be i thought of as a limit full information economy. In the economy E E, X , u and q i i i are defined as before but now each e is F F -measurable and Bochner integrable.
i i Ž . Note that since in the sequel we will assume that for each i, i s 1,2, . . . ,n ,
is a martingale, it follows that e v , converges m-a.e. to e . Hence,
the initial endowment of agent i in the limit full information economy, i.e., e may i t be viewed as the limit of e , and consequently each e will be F F -measurable. By
replacing in definition 2.1.1 F F by F F one can obtain the notion of limit full i i Ž . information core allocation for the economy E E. Denote by C E E the set of all limit full information core allocations for the economy E E.
Throughout our analysis we will assume that the net of private information Ä 4 economies E E : t g T as well as the limit full information economy E E, satisfies t Ž t . the assumptions a.2.1 and a.2.2 and therefore for each t g T, C E E / B and t t Ž . Ž . Ž . C E E / B. Moreover, since C E E ; C E E the latter set is non-empty as e n n n t w < x well. Finally, we assume that E Ý e n F F s Ý e . This will guarantee 
.1 : Let E E : tg T be a net of priÕate information economies { t } ( t ) satisfying assumption 3.2. If the net x : t g T belongs to C E E then we can t )
( ) extract a sequence from the net x which conÕerges weakly to x g C E E .
Discussion
Assumptions 3.3 and 3.4 together imply a type of consistency of individual and aggregate expectations that we discuss below. In particular, assumption 3.4 implies that n n n
t x Since by assumption a.3.3, e s E e F F by substituting this expression in the
left-hand side of the above equation we obtain that
The above expression implies that private expectations, i.e., what an individual Ž believes hisrher initial endowment will be in period t q 1, which is given by w tq1 t x. E e F F and common knowledge expectations, i.e., what the common belief i i Ž of all agents about agent i's initial endowment at period t q 1 is, which is given w tq1 < n t x. by E e n F F , must balance out on aggregate. Similarly it follows from i j s1 j assumption a.3.2 that for each coalition S,
i.e., private expectations and coalitional common knowledge expectations 10 must cancel out coalitionally.
Notice that assumption a.3.2 is equivalent to the fact that the information that the aggregate initial endowment that the coalition S generates, must be common Ž Koutsougeras, N.C. Yannelisr Journal of Mathematical Economics 31 1999 373-391 383 ) Ž Ž . any limit full information private core allocation i.e., any x g C E E can be reached by a net of approximate private core allocations. One may view this as a kind of stability property that the private core enjoys, in the sense that we can always find an allocation process which leads to the limit full information private core. Alternatively, one may view the conclusion of theorem 3.3.2 as a 'kind' of Ž . lower-semicontinuity l.s.c. of the private core and the conclusion of theorem Ž . 11 3.3.1 as a kind of upper-semicontinuity u.s.c. . It is important however to note that we cannot speak about l.s.c. or u.s.c. of the private core in a rigorous way Ä t 4 because the net of differential information economies E E : t g T we consider Ž . need not converge in a certain topological sense to the limit full information 12 economy E E. In particular, this would only happen if one topologizes appropriately the space of utility functions and the private information sets. Although in principle this can be done we have not pursued this here because we will complicate significantly the technical apparatus of the modeling without advancing the economic insights any further.
The private value allocation

Ž
We now define the notion of a private value allocation see Krasa and Yannelis, . 1994 . 
. The Shapley value of the game G , Shapley, 1953 is a rule which assigns to each agent i a 'payoff' Sh given by the formula
For each economy with differential information E E and each set of non-negative 11 Ž . Gale 1992 studies the stability of equilibrium for an incomplete information model. Roughly speaking it amounts to the fact that the equilibrium will not change very much in response to small perturbations. In our setting, one may also view our 'stability' as changes in the information sets will not change the core outcome too much.
12 t Ž The u.s.c. of the private core in a rigorous setting will mean that if E E converges in a certain t t t t . Ž . Ž . Ž . sense to E E written as E E ™ E E and x converges weakly to x where x gC E E , then x g C E E . Ž . Ä 4 Similarly l.s.c. will mean that if E E ™ E E and x gC E E then there exists x : t gT such that x t Ž t . converges to x and x gC E E . In a different setting and for a deterministic economy with a Ž . continuum of agents, Grodal 1971 has examined the upper-semicontinuity of the core correspondence.
( )
Ž
.Ä 4 weights not all equal to zero , l : i s 1, . . . ,n , we associate a game with i Each net-trade x y e is F F -measurable. 
Ž .
Denote by VA E E the set of all private value allocations for the economy E E.
Ž . Denote by VA E E the set of all approximate private value allocations for the e Ž .
Ž economy E E. Assumptions a.2.1 and a.2.2 assure that VA E E / B see Krasa and . Ž . Ž . Yannelis, 1996 . Since VA E E ; VA E E it follows that VA E E/ B. e e
We can state the analogues of theorems 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and corollary 3.3.1 for the private value.
Ž . Denote by VA E E the set of all limit full information value allocations for E E. It Ž . follows from assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 that VA E E / B.
We now state the convergence and approximation results for the private value allocation. 
{
The interpretation of theorems 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and corollary 4.2.1 is similar to the corresponding results for the core and the discussion in Section 3.4 also applies here. 
Proof of the theorems
Mathematical preliminaries
Ž . Let T, t , m
Ž .
Ž . Ž .
T n n™`Ž . Ž . In this case we define for each E g t the integral to be
It can be shown see Diestel and Uhl, 1977, theorem 2, p. 45 that, if . n s 1,2, . . . is a sequence of Bochner integrable functions such that lim n ™Ž . Ž . < Ž .< Ž . Ž f t s f t m-a.e., and f t F g t m-a.e., where g: T ™ R is an integrable n n . < Ž . Ž .< Ž . function , then f is Bochner integrable and lim Diestel and Uhl, 1977, p. 50 . ( ) We will close this section by collecting some basic results on Banach lattices Ž . for an excellent treatment see Aliprantis and Burkinshaw, 1985 . Recall that a Ž Banach lattice is a Banach space L equipped with an order relation G i.e., G is . a reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive relation satisfying: 
Note that x, y is norm closed and convex hence weakly closed . A Banach lattice L is said to have an order continuous norm if, x x0 in L implies x x0. A very useful result which is going to play an important role in the sequel is that if L is a Banach lattice then the fact that L has order continuous norm is equivalent w x Ä 4 to the weak compactness of the order interval x, z s y g L: x F y F z for every Ž . x, z in L see for instance Aliprantis and Burkinshaw, 1989, theorem 2.3.8 . Ž . Moreover, Cartwright's theorem Cartwright, 1974 asserts that if X is a Banach Ž . lattice with an order continuous norm, then L m, X has order continuous norm 1 Ž Ž . . i.e., order intervals in L m, X are weakly compact . This theorem will be used 1 for the case where X s R X . Ž . Recall that if T,t ,m is a finite measure space, a sub-s-field of t is a subset of t that contains T and that is a s-field itself. Let A be a sub-s-field of t and x be Ž . Ž . an element of L m, X . We say that g g L m, X is the conditional expectation
We close this section by defining the notion of a martingale and stating the martingale convergence theorem. Ä 4 Let I be a directed set, and let F F : t g I be a monotone increasing net of
Ž . 
converges in the L m, X -norm, it also converges almost everywhere,
x s x almost everywhere Diestel and Uhl, 1977, p. 49 .
With all these preliminaries out of the way we can now turn to the proofs of our theorems.
Proof of theorem 3.3.1: We begin with some preliminary observations. For each
Ž . 4 F F -measurable and x v g X v m-a.e. . Also for each i, and each t g T, let 
